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The Lawyer's Duty to Disclose
Material Facts in Contract
or Settlement Negotiations
BY NATHAN M. CRYSTAL*
INTRODUCTION
homas Mistier, protagonist of Louis Begley's novel Mistler's
Exit,I learns that he has terminal cancer shortly after agreeing
to an all-cash sale of his advertising agency to a larger concern
known as Omnium. The news of his impending death leads Mistler to focus
on a number of problems, one of which is that it would be far better from
a tax perspective if the transaction were restructured as a stock exchange
rather than a cash purchase.2 Mistler tells his lawyer, Mike Voorhis, that he
wants to renegotiate the deal into a stock exchange. At first, he does not
inform Voorhis why he wants to make this -change. Mistier privately
reasons that he has not lied to Omnium about his health either personally
or in the contract. Additionally, key man insurance on his life protects
Omnium against loss. Voorhis becomes suspicious, however, and asks
Mistier if anything is wrong with the company.4 Mistier tells him that the
company is fine but then reveals his illness. Voorhis is shocked, but Mistler
dismisses his concerns and demands that they concentrate on business.
Mistler asks about the legal risk he runs if he does not reveal his condition
to Omnium. Voorhis advises Mistler that the legal risk is probably minimal
so long as Onium does not learn about Mistler's disease before the deal
*Roy Webster Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. J.D. 1971,
Emory University; LL.M. 1976, Harvard University. My wife, Nancy McCormick,
provided invaluable assistance in the research, writing, and revision of this Article.
My thanks also to Jim White for reading the manuscript and offering valuable
comments.
I LouIs BEGLEY, MISTLER'S EXIT (1998).
2 See id. at 29.
3 See id. at 36.
4 See id. at 39-40.
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closes. Before completion of the sale, Omnium could simply call off the
transaction. After the sale, Voorhis believes, Omnium would not want to
take the position that Mistler was crucial to the success of the acquisition
yet the company had failed to ask any questions about his health. Voorhis
also concludes that Omnium would face great difficulty in proving
damages. Voorhis does not stop, however, with an explanation of the legal
ramifications ofnondisclosure. He points out that Mistler's demise so soon
after restructuring the transaction would not go unnoticed. He would be
viewed as "sharp and selfish," and his reputation would be tarnished.5
Voorhis admits that they have not refused to answer any of Omnium's
questions but says, "I think it would be right to disclose even if they
weren't smart enough to ask." Mistler disagrees, however, and proceeds
to renegotiate the sale.
Did Voorhis act ethically? In particular, did he have a duty to disclose
the state of Mistler's health to Omnium or to withdraw from the transac-
tion?
Spaulding v. Zimmerman7 is one of the best known cases in profes-
sional responsibility.' David Spaulding suffered severe head and chest
injuries in an automobile accident. Three doctors who treated Spaulding
failed to discover that he also suffered from a life-threatening aneurysm of
the aorta that may have been caused by the accident. 9 The physician
retained by the lawyers for the defense, however, discovered the aneurysm
and reported it to defense counsel about a week before the case was
scheduled to go to trial." Neither Spaulding nor his father, who was the
plaintiff in the case since Spaulding was a minor, knew about the aneu-
rysm. On the day after the case was called for trial, the parties reached a
settlement calling for a payment to Spaulding of $6500." Counsel for
Spaulding then filed a petition with the court seeking approval of the
5 Id. at40.6Id.
7 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
8A recent and extensive critical examination of the case can be found in Roger
C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REv. 63 (1998). Cramton and
Knowles engaged in extensive research into the case to provide a wealth of
information not found in the reported opinion.
9 See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 707. Spaulding was examined by his family
physician, Dr. James Cain, and by two other specialists (an orthopedist and a
neurologist), who examined him at Dr. Cain's request. See id.
10 See id.
" See id. at 708.
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settlement. The petition described Spaulding's injuries but made no
reference to the aneurysm since plaintiff and his counsel were unaware of
its existence. 2 The court approved the settlement.
Early in 1959, about eighteen months after the settlement was
approved, Spaulding was required to take a physical examination by the
Army Reserve. He went to Dr. Cain, his family physician, who had
originally treated him after the accident. In the course of this examination,
Dr. Cain discovered the aneurysm. Dr. Cain recommended surgery, which
was performed, to remove the aneurysm. 3 Spaulding then filed a petition
to have the settlement vacated and the judgment reopened. 4 The trial court
granted the motion, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the
settlement, but this decision was based on principles applicable to
settlements involving minors rather than on any impropriety by defense
counsel:
The court may vacate such a settlement for mistake even though the
mistake was not mutual in the sense that both parties were similarly
mistaken as to the nature and extent of the minor's injuries, but where it
is shown that one of the parties had additional knowledge with respect
thereto and was aware that neither the court nor the adversary party
possessed such knowledge when the settlement was approved. 5
As to the conduct of defense counsel, the court had this to say:
While no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required them to
inform plaintiff or his counsel with respect thereto, or to advise the court
therein, it did become obvious to them at the time, that the settlement then
made did not contemplate or take into consideration the disability
described. This fact opened the way for the court to later exercise its
discretion in vacating the settlement and under the circumstances
described we cannot say that there was any abuse of discretion on the part
of the court in so doing... . 6
Was the Minnesota Supreme Court correct in its dictum that defense
counsel had not violated any rule of ethics or legal obligation in failing to





6 Id. (emphasis added). The trial court had also noted that there was "no doubt
of the good faith of both defendants' counsel." Id. at 709.
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This Article addresses the question of when lawyers have an obligation
to disclose information to the opposing side in contract or settlement
negotiations. 7 Mistler's Exit and Spaulding v. Zimmerman are two
examples of such situations. Part I of the Article reviews the major court
decisions dealing with a lawyer's obligation to disclose information in
contract or settlement negotiations. 8 As will be shown, lawyers have been
subject to disciplinary action and legal liability, and contracts that they
have negotiated have been rescinded, because of their failure to disclose
information in certain circumstances.
The existence of the authorities discussed in Part I raises a significant
question: can this case law be reconciled with the attorney's ethical duties
of loyalty and confidentiality? I address this question in Part II of the
Article. 9 I argue that the case law is consistent with the duty of loyalty
because the cases impose a limited rather than a general duty of disclosure.
The duty to disclose applies either when the lawyer's nondisclosure is the
equivalent of a misrepresentation by the lawyer or wheii disclosure is
required by law. Loyalty does not require or allow lawyers to engage in
misrepresentation or to violate the law on behalf of their clients.20
Similarly, the case law is consistent with the duty of confidentiality
because the duty of confidentiality is subordinate to the principle that a
lawyer cannot engage in misrepresentation or violate the law.2'
The Article goes on to identify courses of action available to lawyers
confronted with contract or settlement negotiations in which their
continued participation without disclosure would be the equivalent of
misrepresentation or would violate the law. I argue that lawyers can
17 On the scope of this disclosure obligation, see infra Part II. Disclosure
obligations in connection with contract or settlement negotiations constitute only
one form of disclosure obligation that lawyers may face. Both ethics rules and legal
requirements may impose disclosure obligations in other contexts. For example,
lawyers who learn that a client has committed perjury have a duty to take
"reasonable remedial measures," including disclosure of the client's perjury to the
court. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1998); see also
id., Rule 3.3 cmt. Lawyers have an obligation to disclose adverse legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction that is not disclosed by opposing counsel. See id.
Rule 3.3(a)(3). In ex parte proceedings, lawyers have an obligation to disclose all
material evidence. See id. Rule 3.3(d). Prosecutors have an obligation to disclose
mitigating information to the defense. See id. Rule 3.8(d).
11 See infra notes 23-108 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 109-225 and accompanying text20 See infra Part II.A.
21See infra Part II.B.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 871058
1998-99] LAWYER'S DuTY TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS
ethically choose in most cases among three courses of action: disclose
without client consultation or consent, disclose after consultation with their
clients, or withdraw after consultation with their clients but without
disclosure. A number of factors bear on the choice among these courses of
action: the seriousness of the harm to the other party that will result from
nondisclosure, the extent to which court approval of the agreement will be
required, the client's interest in nondisclosure (particularly whether the
information that the lawyer would be disclosing is sensitive), the feasibility
and consequences of withdrawal given the status of the case, and the
lawyer's philosophy of lawyering and tolerance for personal risk.22
I. CASE LAW IMPOSING DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS ON LAWYERS
Any analysis of lawyers' disclosure obligations must begin with the
fact that many court decisions have held that under some circumstances
lawyers have an ethical duty to disclose information in connection with
contract or settlement negotiations. This Part reviews important decisions
imposing disclosure obligations on lawyers. These cases are based on a
general principle: lawyers have a duty to disclose material information if
the failure to disclose would be the equivalent of misrepresentation by the
lawyer or when the law requires disclosure. Contract and tort law provide
useful standards for determining when the failure to disclose amounts to
misrepresentation. Discovery rules are also an important source of
standards defining when the law requires disclosure.
The cases imposing disclosure obligations have arisen in a variety of
ways. In some cases, lawyers have been subject to professional discipline
or to civil liability. In other cases, agreements negotiated by lawyers
without disclosure have been subject to rescission. While cases in which
courts have invalidated agreements have been decided on substantive
grounds, the courts in these cases have typically relied on or discussed
ethical principles as a basis for their decisions.
A. Cases in Which Lawyers Have Been Subject to Discipline or Civil
Liability for Nondisclosure ofMaterial Information
Perhaps the most extreme example of nondisclosure occurs when a
lawyer fails to reveal the death of a client. Kentucky BarAss 'n v. Geisler23
' For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying
text.
' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
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was a disciplinary action resulting from litigation arising out of an accident
in which the plaintiff was struck by an automobile while he was walking
on the street. The plaintiff died as a result of these injuries. Shortly after the
plaintiff s death, his attorney contacted opposing counsel and negotiated a
settlement. Defense counsel learned of the plaintiffs death when respon-
dent returned the settlement documents signed by the plaintiff s son, who
had been appointed as the administrator of his estate.24 Defense counsel did
not attempt to rescind the settlement but instead sent the agreed order of
dismissal to the court.25 However, defense counsel then filed a bar
complaint against respondent.26 The Kentucky Supreme Court found
respondent guilty ofmisconduct. The court reasoned that when the plaintiff
died, any further communications by the lawyer without disclosure of the
plaintiff s death were the equivalent of a misrepresentation of material fact
in violation of Model Rule 4.1(a).27 Although the court recognized the
principle that a lawyer is generally not required to disclose adverse facts or
evidence,2 it noted that under some circumstances the failure to disclose
can amount to misrepresentation. The court referred to the comment to
Rule 4.1, which states: "A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer
incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows
is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act."29 The court
administered a public reprimand. 0
Mississippi Bar v. Mathis3 illustrates when a lawyer's nondisclosure
is both the equivalent of a misrepresentation and a violation of disclosure
obligations under discovery rules. Mathis involved a claim by a beneficiary
under accidental death insurance policies. The defendant insurance
companies moved to have an autopsy performed to determine whether the
insured's death was accidental. 2 The attorney resisted the motion on
various grounds. In connection with the motion by the insurance compa-




"In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: a. make
a false statement of material fact or law to a third person ..... MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1998).
2- See Geisler, 938 S.W.2d at 580.29 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (a) cmt (1998).
30 See Geisler, 938 S.W.2d at 581; see also Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Fell, 364
N.E.2d 872 (Ohio 1977); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 95-397 (1995).
31 Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993).
32See id. at 1216.
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nies, the attorney never revealed that he and his client's son had secretly
had an autopsy performed.3 In finding the attorney guilty of misconduct,
the court stated:
The conduct of Mathis which is at issue can be summed up simply: he
failed to disclose the autopsy of June 1986, which was performed on the
body of J.R. Laughlin by Dr. Jerry Francisco, to the court and opposing
counsel in the civil action for bad faith denial of insurance coverage
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
and created, in pleadings and discovery responses, the impression that no
autopsy had been performed.34
By failing to comply with discovery rules, Mathis violated DR
7-102(A)(3), 35 which prohibits a lawyer, in his representation of a client,
from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which he is required
by law to reveal.3 6 The court also emphasized that Mathis's "failure to
disclose is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation." ' Mathis
attempted to justify his conduct by claiming that the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine prevented him from disclosing the
existence of the autopsy. The court rejected this argument, stating that
matters of privilege were not for the attorney to determine on his own.
Even if such privileges were believed applicable by Mathis, it was not for
him to determine that the privilege applied. The proper procedure would
have been for him to object to the interrogatories and deposition questions
and affirmatively assert the privilege, leaving the matter to be decided by
the court 38
33 See id. at 1217.
34Id. at 1219.
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILiTY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1983).
The Mathis court gives no indication that Mississippi's DR 7-102(A)(3) differed
from that given in the Model Code.36 See Mathis, 620 So. 2d at 1220. The court found that Mathis also made mis-
representations to the court and to opposing counsel that no autopsy had been
performed. See id.37 Id. at 1221.
" Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles established in
Mathis inMississippiBarv. Land, 653 So. 2d 899,909 (Miss. 1994), which held that
a lawyer violated discovery rules and ethical standards by failing to disclose and con-
cealing that the cause of the plaintiff's injury was notarock thrown by a lawn mower,
as alleged in the complaint, but a shot from a BB gun. See also Crowe v. Smith, 151
F.3d 217, 239 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming decision that a lawyerwho answered "none"
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Lawyers have been subject to civil liability as well as professional
discipline for failing to disclose information required by discovery rules.39
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell' was an action for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to disclose
certain crucial documents that were covered by a request for production of
documents in a securities fraud action that had been settled and dismissed
with prejudice. Plaintiffs sought to recover the difference between the
amount of the settlement and the amount for which they would have settled
had defendants complied with their duty to disclose.41 In holding that
plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim for relief, the court rejected defendants'
argument that the sole remedy available to the plaintiffs was to seek relief
from the judgment by way of rescission under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b).42 The court ruled that under New York law a party could
either seek to rescind a settlement because of fraud or affirm the settlement
and sue for damages.43
When a lawyer changes the terms of a settlement agreement or
contract, the lawyer has an ethical obligation to disclose the changes to
opposing counsel. In In re Rothwell," attorney Rothwell represented a
client in negotiations with his former employer. The employer had
discharged Rothwell's client after he had moved from Ohio to South
Carolina. To facilitate the move, the employer had loaned the employee
funds to purchase a house. The company offered to buy back the house and
to apply the proceeds to the employee's debt to the company.45 The
company sent Rothwell a deed along with a letter asking Rothwell to have
his client sign the deed. The letter stated, "We will expect your call if there
are any questions." Rothwell modified the deed by inserting a paragraph
in response to interrogatory request for insurance coverage should be suspended for
one year when lawyer knew of potential coverage under D&O policy).
11 For a discussion of lawyers' obligations under discovery rules, see WILLIAM
H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
HANDBOOK ch. 6 (1996).40 Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 668 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
41 See id. at 168.
42 See id. at 170. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) provides for relief
from an order or judgment because of "fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).43 See Cresswell, 668 F. Supp. at 170.
4In re Rothwell, 296 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1982).45 See id. at 870.
46 Id.
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discharging his client from all liability to the company. After his client
signed the modified deed, Rothwell returned it with a letter to the company
stating, "We are returning herewith your package to you duly executed.
Once you have filed the deed of record, please forward on a clocked copy
of same for our files. Thank you." Rothwell did not inform the company
that the deed had been changed. In the disciplinary proceeding, Rothwell
argued that he did not have a duty to disclose the change in the deed to the
company and that his change was merely a counteroffer. The South
Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding Rothwell in
violation of several disciplinary rules including DR 7-102(A)(3), which
prohibits a lawyer from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that
information which the lawyer is required by law to reveal.48 Rothwell
received a public reprimand.49
Rothwell was a disciplinary action, but lawyers have also been held
subject to civil liability for failing to disclose changes in contract docu-
ments. Wright v. Pennamped° was a civil action brought by a borrower in
a loan transaction against the lender's attorney. The borrower alleged that
the attorney had changed the prepayment provisions of the note and
mortgage from the provisions in an earlier draft without disclosing the
change to the borrower or his counsel.5' The Indiana Court of Appeals held
that these allegations stated a claim against the attorney for both actual and
constructive fraud through nondisclosure. "By undertaking the tasks of a
drafting attorney, includingthe distribution of draft loan documents and the
solicitation of review and approval ofthe documents, Pennamped assumed
a duty to disclose any changes in the documents prior to execution to the
other parties or their respective counsel." 52 The court went on to hold that
the attorney's conduct also violated the Indiana Rules of Professional
Conduct:
Furthermore, Appellees' argument is in contradiction with Rule
4.1 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct which states, "[i]n the course
of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly ... (b) fail to
disclose that which is required by law to be revealed." Ind. Professional
47Id.
48 SeeMODELCODEOFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILriY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1983).
49 See Rothwell, 296 S.E.2d at 871; see also Illinois State Bar Op. 95-10, [12
Current Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 56 (1996).
50 Wright v. Pennamped, 657 N.E.2d 1223, as modified on reh'g, 664 N.E.2d
394 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
5' See id. at 1228.52Id. at 1231.
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Conduct Rule 4.1 (b). As previously stated, the drafting attorney assumes
a duty to disclose any changes in the documents prior to execution to the
other parties.53
If a lawyer makes a representation that is true when made but later
learns that the representation is now false, the lawyer has an ethical duty to
inform the opposing party of this change. In In re Williams,54 respondent
represented a tenant in connection with a dispute with a landlord regarding
the maintenance of his house. Williams wrote to the landlord to demand
repairs and to inform the landlord that he would hold the rent in escrow
until the repairs were made.5 In a subsequent letter, Williams informed the
landlord that the tenant would contract for the repairs and would pay the
cost from the rent held in escrow. A few days later, however, the tenant
moved out of the house. The lawyer returned a rent check to the tenant, but
he did not inform the landlord that he had returned the check. The bar
conceded that Williams had not engaged in misrepresentation because at
the time he wrote to the landlord he intended to hold the rent in escrow.56
The court accepted this concession and treated the case as one involving
nondisclosure rather than affirmative misrepresentation. 7 Nonetheless, the
court found Williams guilty of misrepresentation by failing to disclose that
he was returning the rent check to the tenant.
53 Id. at 1235. Indiana's version of Rule 4.1(b) differs from the Model Rules
promulgated by the American Bar Association. ABA Model Rule 4.1(b) provides
as follows:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly...
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
MODELRuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b) (1998). As developed more
fully in this Article, the basis of a lawyer's duty to disclose material information
in contract negotiations is not Model Rule 4.1 (b) but rather Model Rules 4.1(a) and
Rule 8.4(c). Rule 4.1 (a) states: "In the course ofrepresenting a client a lawyer shall
not knowingly ... (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person." Id. Rule 4.1(a). Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." Id. Rule 8.4(c). The duties set forth in Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c)
are not qualified by the duty of confidentiality. See infra Part II.B.
'
4In re Williams, 840 P.2d 1280 (Or. 1992).55 See id. at 1282.
56 See id. at 1283.
57 See id. at 1283-85.
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A misrepresentation can be made by making an assertion that is not in
accordance with the truth when made... or by failing to correct a
representation that, although true when made, is no longer true in the
light of information later acquired.
We find that the accused made a material misrepresentation in failing
to correct the representations contained in his letter of December 10, when
he knew that others believed that he held the rent in his trust account.
Thus, the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).58
Discovery rules also require corrective disclosure. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 provides that a "party who has made a disclosure... is
under a duty to supplement or correct the disclosure or response to include
information thereafter acquired... if the party learns that in some material
respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect." 9
Cases involving the death ofa client, surreptitious changes in contracts,
or failure to correct representations that are now known to be false are
rather extreme situations. Courts, however, have disciplined lawyers for
nondisclosure in much less egregious situations. State ex rel. Nebraska
State Bar Ass'n v. Addison' dealt with nondisclosure of insurance
coverage. The defendant attorney represented a pedestrian injured in a
collision between two automobiles. As a result of his injuries, the client
incurred hospital expenses of more than $100,000.61 The attorney engaged
in negotiations with the business manager of the hospital, seeking a release
of the hospital's lien in exchange for reduced payment of the client's bills.
One driver had a liability policy with $100,000 coverage and a separate
umbrella policy of $1 million; the other driver's coverage was limited to
$50,000. During these negotiations, the attorney learned that the hospital's
58 d. at 1284 (emphasis added).
59 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(e)(1). From the text of Rule 26(e), it is unclear whetherthe
Rule requires supplementation of deposition testimony. Rule 26(e)(1) refers to
supplementation of depositions of experts, but it does not mention other
depositions. Rule 26(e)(2) requires supplementation of interrogatories, requests for
production, and requests to admit, without mentioning depositions. See id. 26(e)(2).
Despite this language, however, it appears that the duty to supplement applies to
depositions as well as to the other forms of discovery. See, e.g., Bunch v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1271, 1280 (9th Cir.1982); Gaytan v. Kapus, 181 F.R.D. 573,580
(N.D. Ill. 1998). But see 6 Moore's Federal Practice (MB) § 26.13 1[1], at 26-299
n.7 (3d ed. 1997).
6 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb.
1987).61 See id. at 856.
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business manager was under the mistaken impression that there were only
two insurance policies available to pay claims; the manager was unaware
of the $1 million umbrella policy. Nonetheless, the attorney negotiated a
release of the lien without disclosing the third policy.62 The Nebraska
Supreme Court found that the attorney had violated DR 1-102(A)(4),63
which prohibits a lawyer from engaging "'in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.' "6
Lawyers have also been disciplined for failure to disclose secret
settlement agreements. InIn re Fee,65 respondents representedthe plaintiffs
in a medical malpractice action pursuant to a forty percent contingency fee
agreement. The parties engaged in contentious negotiations before a
settlement judge, who functioned as a mediator. Defendants made an offer
of a structured settlement coupled with a separate offer of attorneys' fees,
which was less than the amount under the contingency fee agreement. In
order to keep the substance of the settlement available, plaintiff and her
attorneys made a side agreement in which she agreed to pay an amount out
of her cash settlement for attorneys' fees in addition to the amount offered
by the defendant.
Respondents did not reveal this agreement to the settlement judge
because, they later argued, the settlement judge had no authority over
fees.67 They testified at their disciplinary hearing that they had planned to
reveal the fee agreement to the trial judge in connection with the approval
of fees in medical malpractice actions as required by Arizona rules.6
Respondents never got that opportunity, however, because the plaintiff
called the settlement judge and asked if she was required to pay the fees
62 See id.
63 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1983).
6 Addison, 412 N.W.2d at 856 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)). The referee also found the defendant guilty of
violating DR 7-102(A)(5), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly
make a false statement of law or fact." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5). On the general civil liability of attorneys for
nondisclosure, see Midwest Commerce Banking Co. v. Elkhart City Centre, 4 F.3d
521, 524 (7th Cir.1993) ("Omissions are actionable as implied representations
when the circumstances are such that a failure to communicate a fact induces a
belief in its opposite.").61 In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975 (Ariz. 1995).
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under the side agreement, The settlement judge then filed a complaint with
the disciplinary authorities.6 9
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the attorneys violated Rule
3.3(a)(1), which provides that: "A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal."" The court went on
to point out that the comments to Rule 3.3 state that "[t]here are circum-
stances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirma-
tive misrepresentation."7' The court expressly rejected the views of some
commentators that the nature of negotiations required only a minimal level
of truthfulness. "Although this court is by no means naive to the realities
of the marketplace, we are unwilling to accept or endorse such a flimsy
ethical standard. It is not unreasonable to expect more from members of the
bar, and we do." The court ordered a public censure. 3 While Fee involved
nondisclosure to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(a)(1), the duty would appear
to be equally applicable to disclosure to opposing counsel because the
language of Rule 4.1(a), which applies to third persons rather than to
courts, is identical in its effect to Rule 3.3(a)(1).74
B. Cases in Which Agreements Have Been Held Invalid Because of the
Lawyer's Nondisclosure ofMaterial Information
Not only have lawyers been subject to disciplinary action or civil
liability for nondisclosure or for violation of discovery rules, courts have
also rescinded contracts on the ground ofnondisclosure by lawyers. As an
initial point, it could be argued that cases in which courts have rescinded
contracts because of nondisclosure do not support the proposition that
lawyers have an obligation to disclose information. Such cases could
instead stand for the proposition that a contract entered into without
appropriate disclosure exposes the client to the risk of rescission or civil
liability but that the lawyer has done nothing unethical or illegal by failing
69 See id.
70 Id. at 978 (quoting ARiz. R. Sup. CT. Rule 42, ER 3.3(a)(1)). Arizona's rule
mirrors Model Rule 3.3(a)(1).
71 Id.
2 Id.
' See id. at 980. A dissenting judge saw the respondents' conduct as more
serious and would have ordered suspension. See id. at 980-81 (Corocoran, J.,
dissenting).
74 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1998),
with id. Rule 3.3(a)(1).
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to disclose information to the opposing party. Lawyers would have an
obligation to counsel their clients about all aspects of nondisclosure,
including the risk of rescission or civil liability for nondisclosure.75 If the
client decided to accept this risk, however, the lawyer could ethically and
legally proceed to participate in the contract or settlement without
disclosure. Indeed, this appears to be the holding of Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, where the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the
settlement agreement was subject to rescission but also indicated that the
defense lawyers had not violated any rule of ethics or law by failing to
disclose their knowledge of Spaulding's aneurysm.76
This analysis should be rejected. First, in contract rescission cases,
courts have not simply rescinded the contract but have instead often stated
or indicated that the lawyers acted unethically by failing to disclose
information under the facts of the particular case. Second, under this
analysis, lawyers would be allowed to conclude a contract or settlement
agreement even though they knew the agreement would be subject to
rescission for nondisclosure. This analysis seems inconsistent with the
lawyer's obligation not to counsel or assist a client in fraud." As Judge
Alvin Rubin stated in his seminal article on the ethics of negotiation,
lawyers' obligations in negotiation should be at least as great as their
clients'. Under Rubin's analysis, if the client has an obligation to disclose
information in connection with contract orsettlementnegotiations, lawyers
have a parallel duty.
If he is a professional and not merely a hired... hand, the lawyer is not
free to do anything his client might do in the same circumstances. The
corollary of that proposition does set a minimum standard: the lawyer
must be at least as candid and honest as his client would be required to be.
75 See id. Rule 2.1.
76 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Later decisions have indicated
that Spaulding could be read somewhat more broadly. See Virzi v. Grand Trunk
Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507,510 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding
a duty to disclose to the court in connection with approval of settlement); Kernan
v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 713 A.2d 411, 465 (N.J. 1998)
(Pollack, J., concurring) (finding a duty to disclose defendant's bankruptcy to
opposing party). But see Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 237 n.30 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding it difficult to accept nondiscovery-related duty to reveal insurance
coverage based on Spaulding). On the counseling obligations of defense attorneys
in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, see Cramton & Knowles, supra note 8, at 84-96.
77 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d).
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The agent of the client, that is, his attorney-at-law, must not perpetrate the
kind of fraud or deception that would vitiate a bargain if practiced by his
principal.78
Thus, the rescission cases should be seen as supporting and extending the
principle that in some situations lawyers have a duty to disclose informa-
tion to the opposing side.
Some of the rescission cases involve fact patterns similar to the
disciplinary cases discussed above. For example, Virzi v. Grand Trunk
Warehouse & Cold Storage Co.79 involved rescission because plaintiff's
counsel failed to reveal the death of his client. Virzi was a personal injury
action that was subject to mediation under local district court rules. At the
time of the mediation, plaintiff's counsel was unaware that his client had
died a few days earlier. After the mediation, counsel learned of his client's
death but nonetheless proceeded to conclude a settlement based on the
mediation panel's evaluation without informing opposing counsel or the
court. Counsel for plaintiff informed the attorney for the defendant of his
client's death as they were leaving the court after the settlement had been
placed on the record.8 ° The court cited DR 7-102(A)(3) and (5) of the
Model Code and Model Rules 3.3 and 4.1.1 The court also referred with
approval to several decisions that indicated that disclosure was required,
including Spaulding v. Zimmerman and Toledo Bar Ass "n v. Fell.2 Based
on these authorities the court concluded that plaintiff's counsel had an
ethical duty to both the court and to opposing counsel to reveal his client's
death.
78 Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiations, 35 LA. L.
REv. 577,589 (1975). Similarly, Professor James White in his influential article on
negotiations expressed his support (with some cautionary statements) for a
proposed model rule of professional conduct that would have required lawyers to
disclose information necessary to correctamanifest misapprehension of fact or law
resulting from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by the
lawyer to have been made by the client. See James J. White, Machiavelli and the
Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. I.
926, 935.
79 Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.
Mich. 1983).
80 See id. at 508.
8tSee id. at 509.
8See id. at 510-11; see also supra notes 7-16, 30 and accompanying text.
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There is no question that plaintiff's attorney owed a duty of candor
to this Court, and such duty required a disclosure of the fact of the death
of a client. Although it presents a more difficult judgment call, this Court
is of the opinion that the same duty of candor and fairness required a
disclosure to opposing counsel, even though counsel did not ask whether
the client was still alive. Although each lawyer has a duty to contend, with
zeal, for the rights of his client, he also owes an affirmative duty of candor
and frankness to the Court and to opposing counsel when such a major
event as the death of the plaintiff has taken place.
This Court feels that candor and honesty necessarily require
disclosure of such a significant fact as the death of one's client. Opposing
counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he would deal in the
marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater honesty, greater candor,
and greater disclosure, even though it might not be in the interest of the
client or his estate. 3
In other rescission cases, the courts have also emphasized the lawyer's
ethical obligation to disclose basic facts when the lawyer knows that the
other side is entering into an agreement based on a mistake about those
facts. Hamilton v. Harper8 4 arose out of an automobile accident in which
one plaintiff was killed and the other seriously injured. Nationwide
Insurance Company was the insurer for the passenger in the vehicle driven
by the defendant.85 Plaintiffs claimed that the passenger was liable for their
injuries because he had substantially encouraged or assisted the defendant
driver's alcohol or drug impairment. 6
Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action against the
passenger in federal court seeking a determination of whether its policy
provided coverage for the passenger's conduct. At the same time,
Nationwide entered into settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs.
Nationwide first made an offer that it would pay the plaintiffs $200,000,
the amount of its policy limits, if the declaratory judgment action resulted
in a finding of coverage. Plaintiffs rejected this offer.8 7 Nationwide then
made an offer to pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in exchange for dismissal of
83 Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512.
84 Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991).
"
5See id. at 541.
16 See id. at 541 n.1.
17 See id. at 541-42.
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plaintiffs' claims against the passenger and dismissal of the declaratory
judgment action. On December 22, 1988, counsel for plaintiffs informed
Nationwide's counsel that plaintiffs acceptedthis offer."8 Plaintiffs' counsel
had just learned that the federal court had granted summary judgment for
Nationwide in its federal court declaratory judgment action. Plaintiffs'
counsel also knew that counsel for Nationwide had not yet learned of the
federal court's decision. When Nationwide learned of the federal court's
decision, it refused to go forward with the settlement. Counsel for the
plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement. The trial court granted the
plaintiffs' motion, but the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed. The court found that the settlement agreement was unenforceable
due to failure of consideration. 9 The court recognized that the settlement
agreement was not technically conditioned on the outcome of the federal
action,90 but it ruled that the plaintiffs' counsel knew that "Nationwide's
primary incentive for offering the $100,000 cash settlement was the
unknown outcome of the declaratory judgment action."91 While the court
decided the case on contract principles, it chastised plaintiffs' counsel for
nondisclosure of the federal court judgment. The attorney argued that he
was not required to disclose the federal court judgment because Rule 4.1
of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct9 did not require
disclosure.93 The court rejected this argument:
As justification for not informing Nationwide regarding the issuance of
the summary judgment ruling in its favor by the district court, the
Hamiltons cite the comment to Rule 4.1 of the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct. Rule 4.1 is entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to
Others" and provides that:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
While the commentary section to Rule 4.1 does indeed state that "[a]
lawyer... generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party
88 See id. at 542.
89 See id. at 544.
90See id. at 544 n.6.
91 Id. at 544.
92 WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1997).
93See Hamilton, 404 S.E.2d at 542.
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of relevant facts," the same commentary also notes that
"[m]isrepresentations can... occur by failure to act," and that "[m]aking
a false statement includes the failure to make a statement in circumstances
in which nondisclosure is equivalent to making such a statement." While
we do not dispose of this case on the grounds of misrepresentation or
fraud, we take a particularly dim view of the Hamiltons' attorney's failure
to disclose his knowledge regarding the action taken by the federal court.
The preferred course of action for the Hamiltons' counsel, in our opinion,
would have required him to voluntarily disclose that information to
Nationwide in the spirit of encouraging truthfulness among counsel and
avoiding the consequences of his failure to disclose, e.g. this appeal.94
Similarly, Kath v. Western Media, Inc.95 was a suit in Wyoming
between former codefendants in business-related litigation in Montana.
One lawyer had represented all of the defendants in the Montana litigation.
The Montana lawyer's deposition was taken in connection with the
Wyoming litigation; he testified that he had represented all the
codefendants in Montana equally. Shortly after the Montana attorney's
deposition, the lawyer for the Wyoming defendants found a letter from the
Montana lawyer to the Wyoming lawyer's clients showing that the
Montana lawyerwas protecting their interests overthe interests of the other
defendants in the Montana litigation.96 When he learned about the letter, the
attorney for the Wyoming defendants contacted plaintiffs' counsel to learn
whether a prior settlement offer was still open. After several telephone
conversations, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement. The
attorney for the Wyoming defendants did not disclose the letter from the
Montana lawyer in connection with these settlement negotiations. On the
same day the settlement was reached, the Montana lawyer sent a copy of
his letter to the Kath plaintiffs. They immediately sought to revoke the
settlement on the ground that they would not have settled if they had
known of the conflict of interest of their Montana lawyer.97
The trial court confirmed the settlement, but the Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the lawyer for the Wyoming defendants had
an ethical duty to disclose the letter from the Montana lawyer.98 The court
9Id. at 542 n.3.
95 Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).96 See id. at 99.97 See id. at 100.98See id.
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relied on DR 7-102(A)(3). 99 The Kath court stated that the duty to disclose
ran equally to the court and to opposing counsel: "We hold that appellees'
counsel owed a duty of candor and fairness to disclose to opposing counsel
and the court [the] letter of June 23, 1980."'
Virzi, Hamilton, andKath all involve nondisclosure of basic facts when
the lawyer knows that the other party is entering into a settlement based on
a mistake about those facts. Nondisclosure of significant mathematical
errors has also been the basis for rescission of settlement agreements. For
example, Stare v. Tate"0 ' was an action by an ex-wife to reform a property
settlement agreement entered into by parties prior to their divorce and to
enforce the agreement as reformed. The agreement was the result of
extensive negotiations between parties who were both represented by
counsel. The parties agreed that community property would be divided
equally, but they disagreed about the value of a piece of real estate referred
to as the "Holt property." The wife contended that the Holt property was
worth $550,000, while the husband argued that the property had a value of
no more than $450,000. The property was subject to a mortgage of
approximately $300,000.102 The wife's attorney submitted a settlement
offer based on a $550,000 valuation of the Holt property, but the attorney
made a mathematical mistake of $100,000 in computing the equity in the
property." The husband's lawyer and his accountant spotted the error but
did not reveal the mistake to the wife's attorney. They reasoned that the
mistake was the equivalent of acceptance of the husband's valuation of the
property.' Acting on the husband's behalf, they presented a counteroffer
that usedthe mistake by the wife's attorney. After some further negotiation,
the parties reached agreement based largely on the terms of the husband's
counteroffer. ' The mistake would probably never have come to light
except that after the settlement agreement was signed, the husband sent a
note to his wife gloating over the fact that she and her attorney had made
a mistake."° The California Court of Appeals held that the agreement
should be reformed to reflect the wife's intent. The husband argued that
99 See id. at 101 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(3) (1980)).
OId. at 102.
10, Stare v. Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1971).
'2 See id. at 265.
103 See id.





reformation was inappropriate because this remedy would force the
husband to enter into a contract that he did not intend to make. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the husband was estopped to claim
that his intention varied from the wife's. 0 7 While the court did not
specifically address the propriety of the conduct by the husband's lawyer,
it did say this:
The mistake was known to Tim's former attorney who swept it under the
rug in the counter-offer by setting forth just the equity, instead of the
value minus encumbrances, as he did with respect to other properties.
True, he apparently justified this to himself morally by the fact that the
value which Tim hadbeen claiming all along resulted in a $70,000 equity,
but he never drew the other side's attention to the fact that the coun-
ter-offer was based on Tim's previous position on the value of the Holt
property108
I. RECONCILING THE CASE LAW WITH
THE DuTIEs OF LOYALTY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Many lawyers will resist the idea that they have an obligation to
disclose information to the opposing party in contract or settlement
negotiations. They will claim that such disclosure violates the lawyer's
duty of loyalty, undermines the adversarial system, and infringes on the
duty of confidentiality. In this section, I argue that these objections are
unsound when the scope of the duty of disclosure is properly defined.
A. The Duty ofLoyalty and the Lawyer's Obligation to Disclose
The lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client is not unlimited. It is well
established that it is improper for lawyers to engage in illegal or fraudulent
conduct in representation of their cients. 109 The duty to disclose material
lO7See id. at 268.
'
8 Id. at 267; see also Building Serv. Employees Pension Trust v. American
Bldg. Maint. Co., 828 F.2d 576,578 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining that questions of
fact exist as to whether settlement of dispute about amount of interest payments on
delinquent employer contributions to employee pension and health and welfare
trusts can be subject to rescission on ground that employer's counsel took
advantage of mathematical mistake by attorney for trusts).
109 See MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCTRule 1.2(d) (1998); id. Rule
3.3(a)(1), (2); id. Rule 4.1; id. Rule 8.4(b), (c). See generally NATHAN M.
1074 [VOL. 87
1998-99] LAWYER'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS
information is fully consistent with the duty of loyalty when it is recog-
nized that the duty to disclose applies when the failure to disclose wouId be
the equivalent of misrepresentation or when nondisclosure would violate
other law. In other words, the lawyer's duty of disclosure is not an
independent obligation but rather a further application ofthe basic principle
that lawyers cannot engage in fraud or illegality.
In many of the cases discussed in Part I, the courts found that the
lawyer's nondisclosure was the equivalent of misrepresentation, a violation
of a legal obligation, or both. In Kentucky BarAss 'n v. Geisler,"0 the court
stated that Geisler's continued communications and negotiations without
disclosure of his client's death amounted to misrepresentation in violation
ofModel Rule 4.1(a).'11 The court cited with approval the comment to Rule
4.1, which states that "'[m]isrepresentations can also occur by failure to
act.' 11,2 Similarly, the court in State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass 'n v.
Addison"3 affirmed that the lawyer violated DR 1-102,14 which prohibits
in part "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion"' 5by failing to disclose the existence of additional insurance coverage
in negotiations with a hospital for release of its lien. Ini Hamilton v.
Harper,"6 the court set aside the settlement because the plaintiff's counsel
had failed to reveal that summary judgment had been granted for the
insurance company in its federal court declaratory judgment action. As in
Geisler, the Hamilton court cited with approval the comment to Rule 4.1,
which provides not only that "[m]isrepresentations can.., occur by failure
to act," but also that "[m]aking a false statement includes the failure to
make a statement in circumstances in which nondisclosure is equivalent to
CRYSTAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 66 (1998).
Ho Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
"'See id. at 580.
12 Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt.).
... State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb.
1987).
,,4 See id. at 856.
"- MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1983).
The court also affirmed the finding that the defendant was guilty of violating DR
7-102(A)(5), see Addison, 412 N.W.2d at 856, which provides that a lawyer shall
not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1983).
.. Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991).
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making such a statement."' 11 InMississippiBarv. Mathis,"8 the lawyerwas
disciplined for failing to reveal information that he was required to reveal
under discovery rules and for nondisclosure when the failure to disclose
was the equivalent of misrepresentation.' 9
The case law is also consistent with the ALI's recently adopted
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.20 Section 157 of the
Restatement provides:
A lawyer communicating on behalf of a client with a non-client may not:
(1) knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to the
non-client;
(2) make other statements prohibited by law; or
(3) fail to make a disclosure of information required by law.'21
Comment e recognizes that generally lawyers do not have a duty to make
affirmative disclosure, but the comment notes that "[a]pplicable statutes,
regulations, or common-law rules may require affirmative disclosure in
some circumstances."'"
The most difficult aspect of the duty to disclose deals with determining
when a lawyer's nondisclosure is the equivalent of misrepresentation.
While the case law discussed in Part I seems to lack any unifying princi-
ples, it is possible to find clarity by comparing this case law with substan-
tive law which defines when nondisclosure is the equivalent of misrepre-
sentation. Section 161 ofthe Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only:
7 Id. at 542 n.3 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1
cmt.).
"' Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993).
119 See id. at 1220-21.
120RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 157 (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997).
121 Id.
"2Id. § 157 cmt. e. Similarly, theRestatement (Second) ofAgencyprovides that
an agent is liable for tortious conduct even when it is committed on behalf of the
principal unless the principal would not be subject to liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958); see also id. § 348 (stating that an agent is
liable for fraud or duress even though conduct occurs in transaction on behalf of
principal).
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(a) where he knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to
prevent some previous assertion from being a misrepresentation or
from being fraudulent or material.
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that
party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts
to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.
(c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing,
evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole or in part.
(d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of
a relation of trust and confidence between them.I13
For convenience, I have given the following labels to these four categories
of disclosure:
1. corrective disclosure;
2. disclosure of known mistakes in a writing;
3. fiduciary disclosure; and
4. disclosure of mistakes about basic facts when required by good
faith.12
4
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981); seeFORTUNEETAL.,
supra note 39, § 17.5 (relying on this section as the standard for when non-
disclosure is the equivalent of misrepresentation).
124 Section 551 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for civil liability
for nondisclosure by a fiduciary as follows:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may
justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business
transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if,
but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to
disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent
his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading; and
1077
The cases discussed in Part I and other authorities fit quite well into
these four categories.
1. Corrective Disclosure
In In re Williams,'25 the respondent was disciplined for failing to make
a corrective disclosure about his handling of his client's rent payments.
Both the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and the Restatement
ofAgency recognize a duty of corrective disclosure.'26 Similarly, lawyers
have a duty to make corrective disclosure under discovery rules. 27
2. Disclosure of Known Mistakes in a Writing
Application of the obligation to disclose known mistakes in a writing
is reasonably straightforward. In re Rothwell2 and Stare v. Tate' both
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make
untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was
true or believed to be so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation
that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other
is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about
to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other,
" because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade
- or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of those facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
While the text of section 551 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts differs from
the provisions of section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
substantively there is little difference. Section 551(2)(a) deals with fiduciary
disclosure; subsections (2)(b), (c), and (d) involve corrective disclosure; subsection
(2)(e) deals with disclosure of mistakes about basic facts when required by good
faith. The Restatement of Torts does not have a section which specifically imposes
a duty to disclose scrivener's errors, but that duty is probably encompassed by
section 551(2)(e), requiring disclosure of basic facts. See id.
"z In re Williams, 840 P.2d 1280 (Or. 1992); see supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
12 6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 157 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 cmt. c
(1958).
127 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
128 In re Rothwell, 296 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1982); see supra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text.
129 Stare v. Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1971); see supra notes 10 1-08 and
accompanying text.
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dealt with disclosure of known mistakes in a writing. In cases like
Rothwell, the lawyer causes the mistake by changing the writing,13 while
in Stare, the opposing party makes the mistake."' In either case, it is
improper for the lawyer to take advantage of the mistake, although cases
like Rothwell may warrant greater sanction.
3. Fiduciary Disclosure
Situations in which lawyers will have a fiduciary duty to the opposing
party to disclose material information in negotiation will rarely occur.
When the opposing party is represented by counsel, a lawyer does not have
a fiduciary duty to the opposing party. If the lawyer is dealing with an
unrepresented opposing party, the lawyer has an obligation to correct any
misunderstanding that the other party may have about the lawyer's role in
the negotiations. Under Model Rule 4.3, if the lawyer reasonably believes
that the unrepresented party believes that the lawyer is representing her, the
lawyer has a duty to correct the unrepresented person's misunderstand-
ing.132 If the lawyer knows about and yet fails to correct a misunderstanding
by the unrepresented party about the lawyer's role, the lawyer may be
subject to liability for breach of fiduciary duty.33 In some limited
circumstances, a lawyer may properly act as an intermediary between
parties engaged in contract negotiations. 3 4 Because lawyers who act as
intermediaries represent both parties, they have a fiduciary duty to disclose
material information to both of them.
135
' See Rothwell, 296 S.E.2d at 870.
11 See Stare, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
132 Model Rule 4.3 states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1998).
131 See Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634, 637-38 (S.C. 1991) (reversing
summary judgment for lawyer because material issues of fact existed as to whether
lawyer had fiduciary duty of disclosure to daughter regarding terms of her father's
will, which the lawyer had drafted, when the daughter consulted the lawyer about
the terms of the will, the lawyer had an on-going professional relationship with the
daughter, and the lawyer failed to disclose that he was representing the father and
not the daughter with regard to the will).
13 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2.
135 See id. Rule 2.2(b), Rule 2.2(b) cmt.
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4. Disclosure ofMistakes About
Basic Facts When Required by Good Faith
Section 161(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that
non-disclosure is the equivalent of misrepresentation:
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure
to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair
dealing.1 36
Section 55 1(2)(e) ofthe Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a party
has a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose:
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about
to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of
the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.' 37
While the language of these two sections is different, they largely agree on
three key elements that trigger a duty of disclosure: (1) knowledge by one
party that the other party is about to enter the transaction based on a
mistake; (2) the mistake relates to basic facts; and (3) failure to disclose
violates a general standard of good faith and fair dealing.
A duty to disclose only exists if the lawyer knows that the other party
is about to enter into the transaction based on a mistake. In most
nondisclosure cases, the lawyer's knowledge of the other party's mistake
is clear. Typically the lawyer receives a communication either from the
client, as in Mistler's Exit,138 or from a third person, as in Spaulding v.
Zimmerman,'39 under circumstances where it is clear that the opposing
party does not know of the fact. Indeed, what normally produces litigation
in these cases is the lawyer's attempt to take advantage of the other party's
ignorance.
The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide guidance
on when facts are basic to the transaction:
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981).
'37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
'
38 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
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A basic fact is a fact that is assumed by the parties as a basis for the
transaction itself. It is a fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the
transaction, and is an important part of the substance of what is bargained
for or dealt with. Other facts may serve as important and persuasive
inducements to enter into the transaction, but not go to its essence. These
facts may be material, but they are not basic.'4
Thus, the concept of a basic fact is one that goes beyond importance or
materiality and rises to the essence of the transaction.141
Finally, nondisclosure must violate a standard of good faith and fair
dealing.'42 Some lawyers will argue that there is no professional agreement
or consensus on the meaning of good faith and fair dealing in negotiations,
and accordingly, this standard cannot be a basis for imposing disclosure
obligations on lawyers. This argument should be rejected for several
reasons. First, the fact that lawyers may disagree about the meaning of
good faith and fair dealing in negotiations is not an argument against the
existence of such an obligation. The law is filled with general legal
principles. Controversy often exists about the meaning and application of
these principles, but the presence of such controversy is not an argument
against having the principle. Just because lawyers and citizens disagree
strongly about the meaning and application of concepts like due process or
reasonable care is not an argument for discarding these obligations.
Second, lawyers are subject to the law, and as discussedpreviously, general
contract and tort law recognize a duty to disclose information when
required by good faith and fair dealing. Finally, lawyers should consider
the consequences of the absence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
connection with contract and settlement negotiations. Do lawyers want to
have a profession in which they do not have a right to expect good faith and
fair dealing from their fellow professionals? Are lawyers willing to state
publicly that the profession's values do not include good faith and fair
dealing when ordinary business people must live by such an obligation?
Admittedly, giving content to the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
difficult, but the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides some general
'
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. j (1977).
"' Comment d to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 provides that dis-
closure is required as to a "basic assumption" but does not elaborate on the mean-
ing of that term. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1981).
'
42 TheRestatement (Second) of Torts does not use the terminology "good faith
and fair dealing," but the concepts it uses are very similar.
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guidance. The Restatement recognizes that the "traditional ethics of
bargaining between adversaries" do not normally require disclosure of
relevant information,143 even when one party is taking advantage of the
other party's ignorance. Superior information and better business acumen
are not the basis of a duty of disclosure.'" At the other extreme are cases
in which a duty of disclosure clearly exists. In such cases, the contract is
"so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is so extreme and
unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which the plaintiff is led by
appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and substance
he is unaware."'45 Between these extremes is where the difficulty of
determining good faith and fair dealing lies.
The cases in Part I fall into five broad groups: first, disclosure of
mistakes regarding the physical condition of a party, exemplified by
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler,l11 Mississippi Bar v. Mathis,47 and Virzi
v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co.;48 second, disclosure
of significant procedural developments, exemplified by Hamilton
v. Harper;49 third, disclosure that witness testimony has been recanted,
as in Kath v. Western Media, Inc.;"0 fourth, disclosure of mistakes
regarding insurance coverage, as in State ex rel. Nebraska State BarAss "n
v. Addison;'5 ' and finally, disclosure of fee agreements when the fees
are part of the negotiation, exemplified by In re Fee."5 2 These groups
should provide some guidance to lawyers as to the types of cases in
which courts have held that they have a duty to disclose basic information.
These situations involve the duty of good faith. As discussed above,
the duty to disclose also applies in cases of corrective disclosure,
disclosure of known mistakes about the contents ofa writing, and fiduciary
disclosure.
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k (1977).
144 See id.
,41 Id. cmt. 1.
'
46 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
14 Mississippi Barv. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993).
148 Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Mich. 1983).
,49 Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991).
'10 Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
, ' State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb.
1987).
"' In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975 (Ariz. 1995).
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B. The Duty of Confidentiality and the Lawyer's Obligation to Disclose
The previous section addressed whether the imposition of a duty to
disclose can be reconciled with the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.
The answer given in that section was that the two obligations are compati-
ble because the duty of loyalty stops at the point where the lawyer engages
in misrepresentation or violates the law; this is the point at which the duty
to disclose arises.
Can the duty to disclose be reconciled with the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality? Central to this question is the application of Model Rule
4.1, which provides as follows:
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.153
On its face the rule appears to impose two obligations on lawyers: a
broad, unqualified duty not to knowingly make false statements of material
fact or law and a narrow duty to disclose material facts. Under this facial
analysis, the duty to disclose is limited in two ways. First, the duty only
applies if disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client. Second, even if the client is committing a criminal or
fraudulent act, the duty to disclose only applies if the information is not
protected by the duty of confidentiality set forth in Rule 1.6.11 Under Rule
1.6 the duty of confidentiality is broad, and the exceptions to the duty are
very narrow. 55 As a result, lawyers would rarely be allowed to disclose
information under Rule 4.1("b). 116
The legislative history of the Model Rules provides some support for
this narrow view of lawyers' disclosure obligations. The Discussion Draft
of the Model Rules, issued by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards on January 30, 1980, included a specific section on
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1998).
154 See id. Rule 1.6.
155 See id.




the lawyer as a negotiator. This section included three rules: Rule 4.1,
"Disclosures to a Client"; Rule 4.2, "Fairness to Other Participants"; and
Rule 4.3, "Illegal, Fraudulent, or Unconscionable Transactions."'' 7
Proposed Rule 4.2(a) stated, "In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be
fair in dealingwith otherparticipants."'' l This broad obligation was quickly
abandoned because it was unworkable. 5 9 Instead, the drafters focused on
the lawyer's obligation of truthfulness.
The proposed final draft of the Model Rules, issued on May 30, 1981,
imposed a fairly broad disclosure obligation on lawyers. Proposed Rule 4.1
stated:
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) knowingly fail to disclose afact to a third person when:
(1) in the circumstances failure to make the disclosure is
equivalent to making a material misrepresentation;
(2) disclosure is necessary toprevent assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act, as required by Rule 1.2(d); or
(3) disclosure is necessary to comply with other law.60
Rule 4.1(b) did not discuss the relationship between the duty of confidenti-
ality and the obligation to disclose, but the comment to the proposed rule
made it clear that the duty of disclosure was superior to the duty of
confidentiality. The comment on disclosure stated, "[a]s noted in the
Comment to Rule 1.6, the duty imposed by Rule 4.1 may require a lawyer
to disclose information that otherwise is confidential."''
Rule 4.1 as adopted by the ABA in 1983, however, substantially
narrowed the disclosure obligation from the Commission's original
proposal. As finally adopted, Rule 4.1 makes three significant changes
'17 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4.1, 4.2,4.3 (Discussion
Draft 1980).
... Id. Rule 4.2(a).
"I See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy
When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1981) (noting that
regulation of trustworthiness cannot go further than to proscribe fraud because of
substantial differences in technical sophistication among lawyers).
160 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (Proposed Final Draft
1981) (emphasis added).
"' Id. Rule 4.1 cmt.
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from the Commission's original proposal. First, it deletes the obligation to
disclose when nondisclosure is equivalent to a material misrepresentation.
Second, it deletes the duty to disclose when necessary to comply with law.
Finally, it makes the duty to disclose, when necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client, subordinate to the duty of
confidentiality.162
Nonetheless, too much can be read into these changes.'63 First, while
the text of Rule 4.1 does not specifically require disclosure when
nondisclosure is tantamount to a material misrepresentation, the comments
indicate that this obligation remains in effect. A comment to the Rule states
that nondisclosure can sometimes be the equivalent of misrepresentation:
"Misrepresentation can also occur by failure to act."'' 6 Similarly, a
comment to Rule 3.3 also provides that nondisclosure in some instances is
the equivalent of a misrepresentation: "There are circumstances where
failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepre-
sentation."' 65 Moreover, Model Rule 8.4 broadly prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresenta-
tion."' Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Model Rules still
prohibit nondisclosure when nondisclosure is the equivalent of a misrepre-
sentation.
Second, while the Model Rules do not specifically require lawyers
to disclose information when required by law, this exception must be
read into the Model Rules. 67 No one, and surely not a lawyer, is above
the law. Further, courts do not have the authority to create rules of ethics
that would exempt lawyers from statutory or other general principles of
law.
162 See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM R. HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 4.1:102, at 711-12 (2d ed. 1990). Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1998), with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
163See 2 HAZARD &HODES, supra note 162, § 4.1:102, at 711-12 (arguing that
the revisions to Rule 4.1 can have little substantive effect when the rule is
considered in relation to other parts of the Model Rules and to case law).
'64 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt.
'
65 Id. Rule 3.3 cmt. This comment to Rule 3.3 should also apply to Rule 4.1.
The comment explains the meaning of Rule 3.3(a)(1), which prohibits lawyers
from making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. Rule 4.1
imposes an identical obligation on lawyers not to make false statements of material
fact or law to third parties. See id. Rule 4.1.
'MId. Rule 8.4.
'
6 7 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 162, § 4.1:303, at 721-23.
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Finally, the legislative history of the Model Rules shows that the
confidentiality qualification to Rule 4.1(b) was intended to have limited
application. The ABA Commission originally proposed a confidentiality
rule that was subject to a number of exceptions. 6 ' As finally adopted,
however, the rule on confidentiality eliminated or restricted a number of
these proposed exceptions. When the ABA considered Rule 4.1, the
American College of Trial Lawyers proposed an amendment to Rule 4.1 (b)
to harmonize that rule with changes in the duty of confidentiality. The
amendment was only intended to apply to situations in which the client had
engaged in wrongful conduct. It was not intended to affect the lawyer's
duty not to engage in misrepresentation under Rule 4.1(a).169
Based on this analysis, Rule 4.1(a) is properly interpreted to require
lawyers to disclose material facts or law when the nondisclosure is the
equivalent ofa material misrepresentation. By implication, lawyers are also
required to disclose information when required by law. Finally, the
limitation on disclosure found in 4.1(b) does not apply when the lawyer's
failure to disclose would be the equivalent of misrepresentation under
4.1(a).
This interpretation of Rule 4.1 makes the rule consistent with the case
law. As shown in Part I, numerous cases have disciplined lawyers because
ofnondisclosure or rescinded agreements that result from nondisclosure by
lawyers when the nondisclosure is the equivalent of a misrepresentation or
' Proposed Rule 1.6(b) stated:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to -result in death or
substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act
in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to
a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved: or
(4) to comply with other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Proposal Final Draft 1982);
see also A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 48 (1987).
169 See A.B.A. CENTER FORPROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 168, at
146.
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when nondisclosure violates the law, without regard to the duty of
confidentiality. In fact, a number of cases have specifically rejected claims
of confidentiality as a defense in such actions. For example, in Mississippi
Bar v. Mathis,7' the attorney attempted to justify his failure to disclose the
autopsy of the insured on the ground of attorney-client privilege and work
product. The court rejected these arguments, stating that issues of privilege
were for the court to determine, not the lawyer on his own.17 ' Similarly, in
People v. Petsas,72 a lawyer was indicted for presenting fraudulent
insurance claims. The fraud involved misrepresentation and concealment
of the fact that his client's injuries resulted from multiple accidents rather
than a single accident. 73 The lawyer attempted to justify his conduct by
claiming that his ethical duty of confidentiality prevented revelation of
information that was damaging to his client. 74 The appellate court rejected
this argument, holding that the duty of confidentiality stops when the
lawyer engages in fraud.
[I]t is true an attorney has an ethical obligation not to disclose
information adverse to his client which is obtained in confidence....
There is a distinct difference between restricting an attorney from
divulging information learned in confidence from a client, and proscribing
him from knowingly making affirmative false representations regarding
a claim or claims of that client' 7"
Similarly, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes
that the duty of confidentiality is subordinate to the principle that lawyers
must obey the law. The comment to section 157 states: "Disclosure, being
required by law..., is not prohibited by the general rule of confidential-
ity.'1 76 Under this analysis, the duty of confidentiality does not constitute
a valid objection to disciplining or holding lawyers civilly liable when
nondisclosure by the lawyer is the equivalent to a misrepresentation or
violates the law.
None of the cases discussed in Part I mentioned any lawyer/client
consultation regarding disclosure. In these cases, the lawyers apparently
170 Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1993).
"7' See id. at 1221.
"7 People v. Petsas, 262 Cal. Rptr. 467 (Ct. App. 1989).
173 See id. at 468.
'
74 See id. at 472.
175 Id.
176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 157 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
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took it on themselves to proceed with the transaction without disclosure,
often because it was in the lawyer's financial interest to conclude the
agreement without disclosure. It would have been appropriate to
discipline these lawyers not only for nondisclosure but also for a failure to
advise their clients about the potential risks to the clients from
nondisclosure.'77
The issue of consultation with the client actually presents two
questions. First, is consultation necessary, or may lawyers disclose on their
own without client consent or consultation? Second, may lawyers avoidthe
obligation to disclose by counseling their clients regarding disclosure and
by withdrawing from representation if the client refuses to authorize
disclosure?
Suppose a lawyer decides that he or she cannot proceed with the
transaction without disclosure. Are consultation with the client and client
authorization necessary before the lawyer makes disclosure? In some cases,
lawyers have the authority on their own, without client consent and without
disclosure to the client, to disclose information when consummation of a
contract or settlement agreement without disclosure of the information
would amount to a misrepresentation or would violate the law.
Under Rule 1.6, all information a lawyer obtains "relating to represen-
tation of a client" is subject to the ethical duty of confidentiality.7 8 When
a client authorizes a lawyer to engage in settlement negotiations, the client
has given the lawyer implied authority to reveal certain information about
the case even though that information would otherwise be subject to the
ethical duty of confidentiality. Rule 1.6(a) provides that a lawyer may
ethically make "disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation." 79 One of the comments to Rule 1.6 states:
A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when
appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the
client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In
litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting
17 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1998) (imposing
a duty on lawyers to render candid advice); see also id. Rule 1.4 (imposing a duty
to communicate).
171 Id. Rule 1.6(a). The ethical duty is broader than the attorney-client privilege
in several ways. The ethical duty applies to information gained from third parties,
not just from the client. In addition, the information need not be conveyed in
confidence. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
179 Id. Rule 1.6.
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a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a
disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. 18 0
Support for this analysis ofthe lawyer's authority can be found in ABA
Informal Opinion 86-1518.18I The ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility dealt with the issue of whether lawyers had a
duty to disclose knowledge of inadvertent omissions of contract terms or
other "scrivener error."'8 The committee ruled:
Where the lawyer for A has received for signature from the Lawyer for B
the final transcription of a contract from which an important provision
previously agreed upon has been inadvertently omitted by the lawyer for
B, the lawyer for A, unintentionally advantaged, should contact the
lawyer for B to correct the error and need not consult A about the error.183
The committee advised that client consent was unnecessary because under
Rule 1.4 a lawyer has an obligation to fulfll "reasonable client expecta-
tions,"' 84 and an agreement based on a scrivener's error is not part of the
client's reasonable expectations. 85 The committee also found that the duty
of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 did not preclude disclosure because the
lawyer was impliedly authorized to make disclosure of information that
"facilitates a satisfactory conclusion.' ' 86
Some lawyers may feel uncomfortable about revealing information
detrimental to their clients based simply on a claim of implied authority
without disclosure to or consent of the client. Such lawyers may conclude
that they prefer to discuss with their clients the risks ofnondisclosure rather
than to disclose on their own. If, after consultation, the client consents to
1o Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. (emphasis added).





186 Id. n.1; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) (holding that a lawyer who receives confidential
documents from the opposing side by mistake should not read the documents but
should notify opposing counsel and abide by his instructions, and any duty to client
is subordinate to obligations to opposing counsel). See generally 1 HAZARD &
HODES,supra note 162, § 1.6:201-1, at 168.33-168.41 (discussingscope ofimplied
authorization to reveal confidential information).
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disclosure, the lawyer does not face a problem. Suppose, however, that the
client refuses to authorize disclosure by the lawyer. At a minimum, the
lawyer must withdraw from the transaction because the lawyer's continued
participation without disclosure will amount to misrepresentation or
violation of the law.
Is withdrawal sufficient? In many cases, withdrawal will not be
sufficient to relieve the lawyer of responsibility for nondisclosure. For
example, when the lawyer learns that a prior representation by the lawyer
was or has become false, the lawyer's withdrawal will not cure the
problem. The lawyer must make a corrective disclosure. 87 In other cases,
it may be unclear whether the lawyer's withdrawal is sufficient. For
example, suppose the lawyer receives a draft ofa settlement agreement that
includes a material mistake to the advantage of the lawyer's client. The
lawyer counsels with the client who refuses to agree to disclosure. If the
lawyer withdraws from the matter, the client may retain other counsel to
conclude the transaction or may continue on pro se. In either event, the
mistake may not be disclosed. On this set of facts, arguably the lawyer has
no responsibility for nondisclosure because the agreement was not signed
until after the lawyer withdrew. On the other hand, the agreement with the
mistaken provision was received by the lawyer while the lawyer was
representing the client. The event that was the basis of the duty to disclose
occurred on the lawyer's watch. Under these circumstances, a court might
well find that the lawyer's withdrawal was not sufficient to avoid responsi-
bility for nondisclosure.
How then should a lawyerproceed? Lawyers have at least three courses
of action available to them: 8'
" disclose without client consultation or notification (the "pure
disclosure" solution);
" consult with the client prior to disclosure, but disclose rather than
withdraw if the client refuses to authorize disclosure (the
"consult/disclose" solution); or
• consult with client prior to disclosure, but withdraw rather than
disclose if the client refuses to authorize disclosure (the "con-
sult/withdraw" solution).189
'
87Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-
412 (1998) (stating that a lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal requires correction
of past representations on which a court continues to rely, and withdrawal is not
sufficient).
188 Lawyers will no doubt think of a number of nuances and variations of these
basic solutions.
"
9 One way to make the withdrawal solution more effective is through a noisy
notice of withdrawal, one which informs either the other party or the court that it
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Each of these courses of action is ethically defensible. The lawyer can
justify the pure disclosure approach on the ground that client consent and
consultation is irrelevant because the lawyer has a duty to disclose to avoid
engaging in misrepresentation by nondisclosure or to avoid violating the
law. Further, under Rule 1.6, the lawyer has implied authority to disclose
information to reach a satisfactory conclusion of a negotiation. 9° An
agreement that is subject to rescission for nondisclosure is hardly a
satisfactory conclusion. The consult/disclose solution is justified on the
ground that a lawyer should consult with the client even about matters in
which the lawyer has the right to make a decision.191 Further, if the lawyer
discloses information without even notifying the client of what the lawyer
has done, the lawyer could be accused of deceit in violation of Model Rule
8.4(c).191 The purpose of consultation is both to inform the client of the
lawyer's planned disclosure and to provide the client with an opportunity
to supply the lawyer with information that might affect the lawyer's
evaluation ofwhether disclosure is required. Finally, the consult/withdraw
solution is defensible in those cases where the lawyer concludes that
nonparticipation rather than actual disclosure is sufficient to avoid
misrepresentation or violation of the law. As noted previously, in some
cases, the consult/withdraw solution is insufficient to remedy the problem.
An example is when the lawyer has made a prior representation that the
lawyer now knows is false.
How should lawyers choose among these courses of action? It is
impossible to give a definite answer as to which course of action a lawyer
should follow. The choice will depend on a variety of factors, including the
following:
" Seriousness of the harm to the other party that will result from
nondisclosure. For example, Spaulding presents a particularly
compelling situation for disclosure. 93
" Extent to which court approval of the agreement will be required.
If court approval is required, the lawyer's nondisclosure involves
a violation of the duty of candor to the tribunal as well as a
should not continue to rely on any opinion, statement, document, or state of affairs.
On the noisy notice of withdrawal, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
'90 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
'' See id. Rules 1.2(a), 1A.
192 See id. Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting attorney conduct "involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation").
'93 See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
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violation of an obligation owed to the other party. The duty of
confidentiality has less force when the issue involves the duty of
candor to the tribunal rather than a duty to the opposing party. 194
" The client's interest in nondisclosure. In some cases, disclosure
would involve "sensitive information." By "sensitive information,"
I mean information about the client the disclosure of which would
damage the client in ways that go beyond simply loss of the value
of the settlement or contract.
" Feasibility and consequences of withdrawal given the status of the
case. In some cases, it may be very difficult for the lawyer to
withdraw. Even if withdrawal is feasible, the consequence of
withdrawal may be the practical equivalent of nondisclosure. On
the other hand, in some cases, withdrawal is reasonably feasible,
and the fact of withdrawal would be sufficient to put the other
party on notice that some reexamination of the transaction may be
required.
" The lawyer's philosophy oflawyering 95 andtolerance forpersonal
risk. Many, perhaps most, lawyers are client-centered in their
approach to lawyering. In cases of doubt, these lawyers will
resolve issues in a way that advances their clients' interests even
if the decision may involve an arguable question of professional
duty and even if it may expose the lawyer to some risk. Other
lawyers follow an officer-of-the-court approach. In cases of doubt,
these lawyers will attempt to determine what both the letter and the
spirit ofthe rules require and will act accordingly, even ifthe result
will not necessarily be advantageous to their clients. Still others
adhere to the old adage, "if someone must go to jail, let it be the
client," as a rule of thumb for deciding difficult questions. Under
this approach, in case of doubt, the lawyer will adopt the approach
that reduces the risk that the lawyer will be exposed to discipline,
sanction, or civil liability.
'94 Compare MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3, with id. Rule
4.1. Rule 3.3, which deals with disclosure to a court, is broader than Rule 4.1.
Under Rule 3.3, the lawyer's duties of disclosure to the court are not qualified by
the duty of confidentiality. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-412 (1998) (dealing with the lawyer's obligation to
disclose when a client has violated a court order).
195 On the concept of a philosophy of lawyering, see NATHAN M. CRYSTAL,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION ch.
1(1996).
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C. Hard Cases
As in any area of law, difficult cases will arise. Brown v. County of
Genesee'96 is such a case. Brown dealt with an employment discrimination
matter. During settlement negotiations, the plaintiff stated on several
occasions that her objective in settlement was to receive, in terms of
benefits and compensation, what she would have received had she been
hired by the defendant county on June 16, 1982.19 The parties entered into
a settlement which provided that plaintiff would be advanced to the third
of seven employment levels (the "C" level). Prior to concluding the
settlement, defense counsel was advised by the county that the highest level
that plaintiff could have had if she had been hired on June 16, 1982, was
the "D" level. 98 "Counsel for defendant did not know, but he believed
[that] it [was] probable' 99 that plaintiff was acting under the mistaken
belief that the "C" level was the highest level to which the plaintiff would
have been entitled.2°° Defense counsel did not ask plaintiff s counsel about
this possible mistake. Subsequently, the plaintiff learned that she would
have been eligible for the "D" level and moved to modify the settlement.2 '
The district court ordered modification and sternly criticized defense
counsel.
What defendant's counsel seeks to do is not only not authorized by
law, but is unethical.
Frankly, I am shocked that defendant's counsel says he has no duty
to advise plaintiff through her counsel that they are operating under a
mistake of fact. Under the defendant's theory, if when paying for a meal
in a restaurant, one by mistake is given back $10 more than entitled to
receive, one is entitled to keep the $10 because of the unilateral mistake.
The converse shows the ridiculousness of the argument: while paying
your check the cashier knows that a $10 addition mistake against the
patron was made and accepts the money in payment on the basis that the
mistake is unilateral.202
196 Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989).
197 See id. at 172.
198 See id.
199 Id.20 See id.
21 See id. at 173.
2
"Brown v. County of Genesee, 694 F. Supp. 250,252-53 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order."3 The court gave
a number of reasons for its decision. First, it noted that the district court
erred in finding that the parties intended to enter into a settlement at the
highest level. The settlement specified the "C" level but did not state that
this was intended to be the highest level that the plaintiff was entitled to
receive. Further, the plaintiff s settlement proposal containingthe "C" level
was in response to the defendant's settlement proposal offering the "B"
level, so there was a manifestation of assent at the "C" level but not
necessarily a meeting of the minds for settlement at the highest level.2" In
addition, information about levels of pay was readily available to plaintiff
because the defendant was apublic entity. Moreover, any misunderstanding
about the settlement was the fault of the plaintiff's counsel for failing to
include a provision in the settlement agreement stating that the plaintiff
was to receive the highest level to which she was entitled." 5
As the difference between the district court and the Sixth Circuit
opinions shows, Brown is a close case, but one that I think was correctly
decided although for the wrong reason. In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit
stated that "nondisclosure to an adverse party and to the court of facts
pertinent to a controversy before the court does not add up to 'fraud upon
the court' for purposes of vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b)."2° The
court cited Kerwit Medical Products v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., °0 where
the court refused to set aside a consent judgment. °" The court in Kerwit
ruled that the plaintiff s failure to reveal facts on which defendant could
have based a defense in a patent infringement suit did not amount to fraud
on the court within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure60(b). 2°
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on Kerwit is insufficient to justify the
result in Brown. Lawyers clearly do not have a duty to disclose facts that
will help establish a defense by the opposing party, as was the situation in
Kerwit.21 ° The issue of disclosure in Brown is much more complex,
203 See Brown, 872 F.2d at 169.
2o4 See id. at 174.205 See id. at 175.
206 Id. (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
207 KerwitMed. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1980).
208 See id. at 834.209 See id. at 837.
210 Cfi ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
387 (1994) (finding no duty to disclose to opposing side or to court that statute of
limitations has run on client's claim).
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however, because the disclosure relates to a factual mistake by the
opposing party about the basis of the settlement agreement.
Nonetheless, the result in Brown was probably correct because the facts
of the case do not fall into any of the categories of cases in which a duty of
disclosure exists. Brown certainly does not involve a case of corrective
disclosure' 1 because defense counsel never represented that the "C" level
was the highest level that plaintiff would have been entitled to receive if
she had been hired on June 16, 1982. The case also does not involve a
fiduciary disclosure.2 12 While an employment relationship existedbetween
the parties, no fiduciary duties exist in connection with the settlement of
the lawsuit in which each party was represented by counsel.
The plaintiff could have argued that the case involved a known mistake
about the contents of a writing,2 3 but it is difficult to characterize the
writing as containing a mistake. The settlement agreement did not refer to
level of pay and benefits to which the plaintiff would have been entitled
had she been hired on June 16, 1982. The case is unlike Stare v. Tate,2" 4
where a mathematical error existed in the plaintiffs settlement offer,215 or
In re Rothwell,2 6 where respondent attorney had changed the terms of the
offer that he received.2?1 7 In addition, for a duty of disclosure to attach, the
attorney must have "knowledge" of the mistake by the other party as to the
contents of the writing.218 In Brown, defense counsel stated that he did not
know but believed that it was "probable" that the plaintiff was operating
under a mistake,219 but "belief' and "probability" do not rise to the level of
knowledge. If a lawyer engages in willful blindness, the lawyer will be
treated as having knowledge of the facts to which the lawyer closed his
eyes,"0 but it is difficult to characterize defense counsel's conduct in
Brown as willful blindness.
Finally, the plaintiff could also have argued that defense counsel had
a duty to disclose the mistake about level of pay and benefits because good
211 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
214 Stare v. Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1971).
215 See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
216In re Rothwell, 296 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1982).
2
,
7 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
219 Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1989).
0 See John P. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal, Scienter in ProfessionalLiability
Cases, 42 S.C. L. REv. 783, 833-38 (1991).
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faith and fair dealing required disclosure.'-' Two objections can be made
to this argument. First, the facts of the case do not fit clearly within any of
the categories of cases in which courts have recognized that good faith
requires disclosure.m On the other hand, the plaintiffs mistake about level
of pay and benefits is similar in significance to the mistake about insurance
coverage in State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass 'n v. Addison.-3 Second,
for the same reasons discussed above, it is difficult to conclude that defense
counsel had knowledge of the plaintiff's mistake such that good faith
requires disclosure.
Although it is probably correct to conclude that the defense attorney in
Brown did not have a duty to disclose the plaintiffs mistake about pay
level, he should have advised his client about the mistake and counseled
with the county about the desirability of disclosure. 4 Indeed, it is arguable
that the county had already implicitly authorized disclosure. The county
had informed defense counsel that the "" level was the highest level to
which the plaintiff was entitled, and it did not expressly direct defense
counsel not to reveal this information to the plaintiff.' 5
CONCLUSION
This Article has been an argument for the following proposition: It is
unethical for a lawyer to fail to disclose material information when the
nondisclosure amounts to misrepresentation or when the failure to disclose
violates discovery rules or other law. The Restatements of Contracts and
Torts provide useful standards for determining when a nondisclosure is the
equivalent of a misrepresentation. Under these authorities, nondisclosure
is equivalent to a misrepresentation in four situations: (1) corrective
disclosure; (2) disclosure of known mistakes in a writing; (3) fiduciary
disclosure; and (4) disclosure of mistakes about basic facts when required
by good faith.' 6 The duty of confidentiality does not preclude disclosure
because the duties not to engage in misrepresentation and not to violate the
law are superior to the duty of confidentiality. Further, when clients
authorize lawyers to enter into contract or settlement negotiations, they
221 See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
223 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb.
1987); see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
224 MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.4,2.1 (1998).
' See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 123-52 and accompanying text.
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impliedly authorize their lawyers to reveal information necessary to
facilitate a satisfactory conclusion. This implied authority reasonably
includes authorization to reveal information necessary to prevent the
agreement from being unenforceable due to nondisclosure. 7
Lawyers have three courses of action available to them when they
confront situations in which their continued participation in contract or
settlement negotiations without disclosure would constitute either a
misrepresentation or would violate the law: the pure disclosure solution, the
consult/disclose solution, or the consult/withdraw solution.' Choice
among these courses of action depends on analysis of a variety of
factors: the seriousness of the harm to the other party that will result
from nondisclosure; the extent to which court approval of the agreement
will be required; the client's interest in nondisclosure, particularly
whether the information that the lawyer will be disclosing is sensitive;
the feasibility and consequences of withdrawal given the status of the
case; and the lawyer's philosophy of lawyering and tolerance for personal
risk 2 9
This Article began with two cases posing problems of nondisclosure.
How do the principles set forth in this Article apply to these cases? In
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, the court held that the settlement agreement was
subject to rescission, but the court also stated that the lawyers had not acted
unethically in failingto reveal the information they had about the plaintiff' s
health 230 Under the principles set forth in this Article, the court was wrong
in its characterization of the lawyers' conduct. Under the facts of the case,
defense counsel's failure to disclose was the equivalent of a misrepresenta-
tion. Defense counsel had a duty to disclose because plaintiff's physical
condition was a basic fact about which plaintiff was mistaken, and the
failure to disclose violatedprinciples of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed,
Spaulding is probably the clearest case for disclosure that can be imagined
because of the threat to the plaintiff's life. Defense counsel should have
immediately revealed this information to the plaintiff without the need for
consultation with their clients. All of the factors bearing on the issue call
for disclosure: the harm was serious, the case involved a duty of candor to
the court because it involved a minor settlement, disclosure would not
reveal any sensitive information of the defendant, defense counsel's
withdrawal on the eve oftrial was not feasible and would in any event have
"
7 See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
2" For a discussion of these factors, see supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
2o See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
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simply reaffirmed the problem of nondisclosure. Finally, any sensible
philosophy of lawyering must give primacy to the value of human life.
In Mistler's Exit, it is somewhat less clear whether the information is
subject to a duty of disclosure. Mistier claimed that his presence is not
material to the purchase of his agency because the agency had key man
insurance on his life, his value to the agency had been internalized into
other employees, and he would not be staying with the agency for many
more years in any event." Nonetheless, given the history of the negotia-
tions, it seemed likely that his health would be treated as a basic fact by
Omnium. When Omnium's chairman, Jock Burns, broached the subject of
a possible acquisition, he referred to the "Mistler factor" as a significant
reason for the purchase.?32 Whether good faith requires disclosure is
another possible issue. The purchaser failed to ask questions about
Mistler's health. On the other hand, Mistler seemed to have a close
personal relationship with Bums. The closeness of this relationship would
probably mean that good faith requires disclosure. Based on this analysis,
attorney Voorhis's continued participation in the transaction without
disclosure of Mistler's health was improper.
The factors bearing on Voorhis's decision as to how to proceed,
however, were different from those in Spaulding. The harm to the
purchaser from nondisclosure was much less clear than in Spaulding.
Disclosure of Mistler's health situation would reveal sensitive information
because disclosure would harm Mistler in ways beyond simply the loss of
his contract with Onmium. Mistier had not told his wife or other members
of his family about his condition. Unlike Spaulding, MistIer's Exit did not
involve a duty of candor to the court. Further, Voorhis's withdrawal was
feasible and would have been likely to put the purchaser on notice to
reexamine the transaction. Based on this analysis, after consulting with
Mistier about disclosure of his health condition, Voorhis should have
informed Mistier that he could not proceed with the transaction without
disclosure. He then should have withdrawn if Mistier refused to authorize
disclosure.
231 See BEGLEY, supra note 1, at 37, 40-41.232Id at 15.
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